Abstract Putnam in Realism in mathematics and Elsewhere, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan in Philos Sci 49: 19-49 (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher in The advancement of science, Oxford University Press, New York (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with each other are approximately true, and that their key terms refer. My position is immune to Laudan's counterexamples to Putnam's inference and yields a solution to a problem with Kitcher's position.
Introduction
Consider such scientific theories as the special theory relativity, the theory of evolution, the theory of DNA, the kinetic theory of gases, and the theory of electrons. They are successful, i.e., they have high explanatory, predictive, and manipulative powers. Putnam (1975) claims that it would be a miracle if a successful theory is not even approximately true, and its key term does not refer. It follows that a successful theory is approximately true, and that its key term refers. Thus, from the premise that a scientific theory is successful, Putnam draws the conclusion that it is approximately true and its theoretical entity is real. Putnam's argument for scientific realism (realism from now on) triggered a debate between realists and antirealists. The most forceful criticism against Putnam's argument was put forward by Laudan (1981) , and the most influential defense of realism from Laudan's attack was advanced by Kitcher 1993) . The aim of this paper is to analyze Laudan's critique of realism and to introduce a new strategy to overcome his criticism. My strategy will be shown to be better than Kitcher's, yielding an insight on which of the current scientific theories are the best, what properties they have in common, and what theoretical claims will survive scientific revolutions in the future.
Laudan's Criticism
Laudan (1981: 33) provides the infamous list of past theories to undercut the realist inference from the success of a theory to its approximate truth and the existence of its theoretical entity. The list consists of twelve past theories, such as the ether theory and the caloric theory of heat. They were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. The ether theory is not even approximately true because its key term 'ether' does not refer, and that the caloric theory of heat is completely false because there is no such thing as caloric fluid. After providing the infamous list, Laudan claims that there is no necessary connection between success and approximate truth:
…there is no necessary connection between increasing the accuracy of our deepstructural characterizations of nature and improvements at the level of phenomenological explanations, predictions and manipulations. (ibid: 35)
In the concluding section of his paper, Laudan claims that there are just too many counterexamples to the realist epistemology, i.e., realists cannot explain success in term of approximate truth and reference: Their epistemology is confronted by anomalies which seem beyond its resources to grapple with. (ibid: 47-48) Note that Laudan says that there are anomalies that realism cannot explain. He does not make the ambitious claim that successful current theories will turn out to be completely false. He only accuses the realists of "foreclosing the possibility that some future generation may come to the conclusion that some (or even most) of the central terms in our best theories are no more referential than was 'natural place,' 'phlogiston, ' 'aether,' or 'caloric"' (ibid: 42) . In other words, he only suggests that it is possible that central terms of current theories might be nonreferring. He does not claim that it is likely that the central terms of current theories are nonreferring. In short, nowhere does he run the pessimistic induction against current theories.
Realists and antirealists alike in the philosophy of science literature, however, do not interpret Laudan as I do. Kitcher, Leplin, and Ladyman attribute the pessimistic induction to him:
Laudan's use of the pessimistic induction from the history of science to discredit the claims to reference and truth of current science and to undermine a realist account of progress is the most sophisticated that I know. (Kitcher 1993: 149) He [Laudan] argues inductively that our current picture is unlikely, in retrospect, to have achieved referential success or approximate truth from the vantage point of future science, and that realism, according, has no application. (Leplin 1997: 137) The pessimistic meta-induction from the history of past theory change in science was originally proposed to confute the realist's claim that truth explains the success of
